Allele Security Alert
Remote command execution during “go get -u”
The Go Authors
Go before 1.11.3 and 1.10.6
Proof of concept
The “go get” command is vulnerable to remote code execution when executed with the -u flag and the import path of a malicious Go package, or a package that imports it directly or indirectly. Specifically, it is only vulnerable in GOPATH mode, but not in module mode. Using custom domains, it’s possible to arrange things so that a Git repository is cloned to a folder named .git by using a vanity import path that ends with “/.git”. If the Git repository root contains a HEAD file, a config file, an objects directory, a refs directory, with some work to ensure the proper ordering of operations, “go get -u” can be tricked into considering the parent directory as a repository root, and running Git commands on it. That will use the config file in the original Git repository root for its configuration, and if that config file contains malicious commands, they will execute on the system running “go get -u”.
Etienne Stalmans (Heroku platform security team)
Go security releases 1.11.3 and 1.10.6
cmd/go: remote command execution during “go get -u” #29230
[release-branch.go1.11-security] cmd/go: reject ‘get’ of paths containing leading dots or unsupported characters
[release-branch.go1.11-security] cmd/go/internal/get: reject Windows shortnames as path components
[release-branch.go1.10-security] cmd/go: reject ‘get’ of paths containing leading dots or unsupported characters
[release-branch.go1.10-security] cmd/go/internal/get: reject Windows shortnames as path components
If there is any error in this alert or you wish a comprehensive analysis, let us know.
Last modified: February 11, 2019